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Abstract: Marino shows that chickens are as complex mentally as other birds and mammals. Yet
common perceptions of chickens are slow to change in response to the science. Human
capacities for willful ignorance, inattention, and avoidance keep us from learning about the
animals we harm, and the inertia of habit and tradition keeps us from taking appropriate action
in response to what we learn. It’s essential for teachers and activists to find ways to overcome
this inattention and inertia.
Keywords: cognition, complexity, inattention, inertia, reform
Kathie Jenni is Professor of Philosophy and Director
of Human-Animal Studies at the University of
Redlands. Her teaching and research focus on
animal ethics and moral psychology. Her most
recent publication is “Empathy and Moral Laziness”
(2016) Animal Studies Journal 5(2), 21-51.
www.redlands.edu/study/schools-and-centers/college-of-artsand-sciences/undergraduate-studies/philosophy/meet-our-faculty/kthie-jenni/

Lori Marino (2017a,b) provides a comprehensive and compelling review of chickens’ mental
lives. The evidence shows chickens are as complex cognitively, socially, and emotionally as other
birds and mammals. Yet common perceptions of chickens are slow to change in response to the
evidence. Indeed, Marino (2017b) notes, many people barely think of chickens as birds at all.
This is partly because chickens, unlike most birds, are categorized as commodities (p. 127).
Marino’s findings matter because many people are more willing to accept exploitation of
simpler animals than of more complex ones. Chickens are among the most brutally abused
animals in the world. This is not recognized as the moral catastrophe it is partly because
chickens are misperceived as simple, comical, and stupid. Yet people who come to know them
through personal contact discover that they are smart, emotional animals with individual
personalities (Marino, 2017b, p. 128).
Marino suggests that the scientific community itself has been unduly influenced by
common perceptions of chickens. Studies of adaptive avian specializations and of simpler
abilities such as associative learning have focused on chickens and pigeons, whereas studies of
processes such as language and tool use in birds have focused on corvids and parrots. This
selective focus in research has prevented chickens from demonstrating their more complex
capacities. Marino (2017b) suggests that in a vicious circle with devastating consequences,
researchers’ choice to focus on simpler abilities in chickens both reflects and reinforces the
“disconnect” between what chickens are actually like and popular images of them (p. 128).
Marino’s aims are to gain a better understanding of the minds of chickens from the
research literature and to identify important areas for future noninvasive research. There is a
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case to be made against invasive animal research, on both moral and scientific grounds. Many
scientists have not adequately grappled with it. (See Engel, 2012; Greek and Greek, 2000, 2004;
Norcross, 2012; and Regan, 2004.) It is unusual and gratifying to hear noninvasiveness proposed
by Marino as an explicit ethical boundary for future studies.
Marino’s review shows that capacities once thought to be uniquely human, such as
emotions, are present not just in chickens and other farmed animals, but throughout the animal
kingdom. Personality traits, too, are common in other animals. Yet it is a daunting battle to use
this knowledge to transform our practices. One hallmark of our species is our remarkably
flexible capacity for willed ignorance, inattention, and self-deception, especially when
inconvenient facts threaten treasured practices (Zentall, 2016). We also suffer from simple
inertia, born of habit and tradition, that keeps us in the grip of prejudices about other animals
long after they are shown to be unfounded. To make things worse, chickens are at an immense
disadvantage compared to animals whose faces we can read, whom we find furry and attractive,
and whose expressive vocalizations readily signal their pain and suffering to us. Marino’s review
shows that pigs share cognitive and emotional capacities with primates. Fish too have been
shown to have complex capacities (Balcombe, 2016a,b); their suffering likewise goes unheeded.
The capacity for suffering and enjoyment alone should be enough to induce us to
renounce causing animals harm. Yet the idea that animals must not only suffer but be smart to
deserve protection is a common one. One step toward ending public support for factory farming
and other atrocities is to make consumers aware of the mental capacity of the species we use.
Marino (2017b) cites a study showing that college students who train and care for chickens
come to change their views about them (p. 128). My experience has been that students who
read moral arguments and descriptions of factory farming, view documentaries about the
practice, and judge that it is wrong still struggle to make personal changes in their diets. Yet
visiting a Farm Sanctuary, where they can physically interact with chickens, pigs, and cows in a
calm and natural setting – where the animals can show their individual natures – can overcome
years of inertia, uncertainty, and waffling. (But see Bottomley and Boughlan, 2017.)
Opportunities to interact with farmed animals are not available to the great majority of
people in urban areas. Are there other ways to reach them? Perhaps chickens need an analogue
to Blackfish (2013), which introduced an individual orca and conveyed his nature and story
vividly enough to turn many people against captive orca shows, which in turn moved businesses
like SeaWorld to change their practices.
Given the financial and political power of agribusiness, changing public policy is even
tougher than changing public perceptions. Yet passage of Proposition 2 in California (2008) and
similar initiatives in other states has shown that citizens care enough about animal cruelty to
vote for reforms when given the chance. At the federal level, the Humane Methods of Slaughter
Act excludes chickens and other birds from even the minimal protection of (supposedly) painless
killing. Objective differences between birds and other farmed animals do not justify this
exclusion; it is also unknown to most citizens and shocking to many when they learn it. Thus it
would make a well-focused target for activist efforts at reform. The killing of male chicks in the
egg industry by suffocating them in plastic bags or dumping them into giant grinders is a similar
extreme: monstrously inhumane, concealed from the public, and a source of moral shock when
it is witnessed. (Undercover footage of this practice is the one – and only – thing that elicits
unguarded gasps from my students, who are otherwise savvy about factory farming practices
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and accustomed to disturbing film footage.) This, too, would make a powerful focus for efforts
to change current practice.
Some activists (Francione, 2015; LaVeck, 2017) denigrate efforts to promote “humane
farming” of animals, arguing that this simply enables those who eat animals to feel better,
without ending the fundamental exploitation and disrespect for animals in agriculture. Thinkers
are right to point out that it is fundamentally wrong to treat animals as mere resources (Regan,
2004), but it would also be wrong (and a betrayal of current victims) to abandon efforts to
remedy the worst suffering of farmed animals. We can advocate for immediate reforms while
seeking to put an end to animal agriculture altogether in the long run.
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